By SYED BADRUL AHSAN
14/11/25
Pakistan’s military and its putatively democratically-elected government have been unusually busy trying to reinvent the country’s institutions. Lawmakers in Islamabad have adopted the controversial 27th amendment to the constitution. The constitution, as one recalls, was adopted in 1973 and was steered into acceptance by the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In the decades which have followed since, the constitution, Pakistan’s third after the 1956 and 1962 constitutions, has been subjected to major changes.
The difficulty for Pakistan today is much more than a simple amendment to the constitution that will strengthen democracy in the country. As a matter of fact, the debate which has been going on around the changes to Article 243 of the constitution are all aimed at adopting measures which will strip away at the semblance of pluralism which remains in the country.
Lawmakers, at least on the government benches, are keen that a Federal Constitutional Court be established. The FCC, if it takes shape, will raise – indeed has already begun to raise – questions about the authority of the Supreme Court. To what extent will the Supreme Court be able to assert its authority, and to what degree it will be reduced to being an appeals court are questions up in the air.
“… the ominous hint of a fresh power grab being made by the all-powerful and pervasive Pakistan army.”
Pakistan’s judiciary has been up against pitfalls in the past, often of its own making. Though independent-minded and assertive jurists like M.R. Kayani have been part of it, there have also been people such as Justice Munir, whose infamous articulation of what he called the law of necessity has consistently belittled the constitutional process in Pakistan. Though Munir came to acknowledge years later that he had been wrong to reach that conclusion, the damage had been done. And in the years of General Zia ul-Haq, the judiciary took another tumble when the dictator manoeuvred a sidelining of some judges and the entry of others to ensure that Bhutto, the Prime Minister he removed in a coup in July 1977, went to the gallows.
One might now put it about that Pakistan’s judiciary has been rather pro-active in the past many years. On the surface, that is what the situation has appeared to be. But a deeper assessment of conditions makes it obvious that the Supreme Court has quite been unable to prevent the regularity of assaults on civilian governments in the country. It has been unable to intervene in elections that have come to be tainted with corrupt dealings.
Judiciary looked the other way
The last election, clearly won by adherents of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, was a political reality overlooked by the judiciary. It looked the other way as the Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan People’s Party banded together to keep Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf out of power.
Which raises the question: will the establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court bring about a positive change in the judicial structure? Not likely, for unless a clear and credible demarcation of authority between the FCC and the SC is drawn in the sand, public sentiment will focus on the idea of things changing but not in a qualitative nature.
Besides this talk of an FCC being midwifed by the legislature in Islamabad comes the ominous hint of a fresh power grab being made by the all-powerful and pervasive Pakistan army. The 27th amendment is focused too on bringing about wholesale changes to the way in which the military has functioned in the country. Obviously, the Pakistan army has never had cause to step back into the barracks, unless the Bhutto years (1971-1977) are to be recalled. At the time, owing to the embarrassment faced by the soldiers in light of their defeat in the Bangladesh war, the army lay low for a few years. But it was Bhutto himself who, unleashing the army against Baloch insurgents in 1973, unwittingly gave it a fresh lease of life in national politics.
The army’s power grab
Pakistan has seen four military dictators take it down the road to increasing depths of darkness. But that is not to say that other generals have not interfered in politics. Aslam Beg went out of his way to make sure that Benazir Bhutto, ready to lead a new elected government in 1988, stayed away from power. Beg did not succeed. Institutions such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) have regularly helped their favourite politicians to manipulate the political process. The army raised Imran Khan to the heights before dropping him to the ground with a thud. It then turned to the Sharifs in a reassessment of its role and helped them back to power through guaranteeing that Imran Khan would not return to office but would remain in incarceration.
At this point of time, the prospect of Pakistan’s military gaining increased authority under the constitution in order to maintain its preponderance in the state structure exercises minds in Islamabad as well as outside Pakistan. The army, headed by Field Marshal Asim Munir, has been exerting pressure on the national assembly and the senate for them to invest it with an unbelievably enhanced measure of power. The idea is to abolish the office of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) and replace it with a new structure to be known as Chief of Defence Forces (CDF). Under the new measures, the CDF will be the head of the army and will be responsible for all promotions, transfers and deployment of not just the army but also the air force and the navy.
In other words, the chiefs of the air force and navy, their wings clipped, will have little or no authority to challenge the chief of the army, in the present instance Field Marshal Asim Munir. But then comes the uncomfortable question: What happens in future, with a General (not every officer will be a Field Marshal) officiating as CDF and the air force and the navy headed by a Marshal of the Air Force and an Admiral of the Fleet required to carry out their responsibilities under him?
Impunity for the military
Increasingly darkening clouds will hang low over Pakistan with the constitution guaranteeing that the three services chiefs will enjoy life-long immunity from any prosecution even after they go into retirement. All three individuals will be legally permitted to be in uniform despite their active service in the forces coming to an end. They can be removed through impeachment, but the impeachment idea is cancelled out by the promise of impunity.
Where do Pakistan’s politicians come into this picture? The short answer is, ‘Nowhere’. The soldiers continue to rule Pakistan without the formality of a coup d’etat. And yet this ongoing discussion around Article 243 of Pakistan’s constitution has seemingly concluded through the military being gifted what it has craved. It is a disturbing step toward a permanent coup being embedded in the constitution for all time.
The 27th amendment to Pakistan’s constitution will formalise the dominance of the military in every area of life in the country — parliament, the judiciary, civilian governments at the centre and the provinces, civil service, academia. Field Marshals and Generals will be emboldened, this time armed with constitutionally ordained authority, to decree the rise and fall of governments as well as the nature of elections through questionable exercises of the ballot.
- This article first appeared in the Dhaka Tribune.
